In the present paper I sketch three genres of sociology of knowledge and trace their roots to Marx and Marxist literature while reconstructing two causal and one hermeneutic strand in this context. While so doing the main focus is set on György Lukács and György Márkus and their interpretation of Marx's contribution to sociologically minded theories of knowledge. As a conclusion I point out that Marx-inspired sociologies of knowledge are more sensitive to the relation of larger-scale social and historical processes than to the actual practices of knowledge production, and that recent developments in science studies tend to integrate larger-and smaller-scale sociological sensitivities.
On this view, there is certainly a place for individual creativity, but it is constrained in at least two ways. Creativity, on the one hand, is inevitably exhibited in a specific institutional and social setting that provides the framework of socialization as a background for any kind of creative work. On the other hand, the emergence of ruling or successful ideas is due to a process of selection that is driven by the institutional superstructure. Thus, it is thus through institutions that economic relations exert causal influence on the production of ideas.
Although Marx was inclined to exempt science from ideological influences, 6 an exemplary analysis of such conditioning can be found in Boris Hessen's 1931 classic study on the genesis of Newtonianism. 7 Hessen's first thesis is the claim that a particular aspect of the productive forces in the early modern period, namely its machine technology, was a condition of the development of early modern mechanics, a thesis that is fairly explicitly confirmed in Newton's preface to the Principia where he claims that "mechanics is the subject that comprises all the manual arts." He goes even further when he claims that "geometry is founded on mechanical practice." It seems that Newton himself may be even more radical than Marx when he subsumes geometry, for Marx a non-ideological form of knowledge, to mechanical practice, i.e. to a given level of development of the productive forces.
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Hessen's second thesis strengthens the first and explains the lack of development in other fields of physics, such as, for example, thermodynamics, with recourse to the lack of existing technologies. Taken together, the two theses represent forces of production as inciting and limiting factors that as such determine knowledge production. Hessen's first two theses illustrate the direct causal link between the development of productive forces and intellectual production in general.
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In his History and Class Consciousness (1923) Georg Lukács drew attention to another set of conditions that explain the success of early modern mathematical natural philosophies, namely economic conditions and their formative influence on perceptions of nature and society. Lukács emphasizes the tendency of capitalism to produce a social structure that fits conveniently with the outlook of the modern mathematical natural 6 For a discussion see Cohen 1978 , 46, Lynch 1994 It has been recently republished as Hessen 2009. 8 Although the Preface is largely ignored by the interpreters of Newton, Guicciardini (2009, 293-299) offers an illuminating discussion of this aspect. 9 For a good summary of Hessen's theses see Freudenthal and MacLaughlin (2009). sciences: due to the centrality of mathematical representation the natural sciences reduce phenomena to numerical relations. It belongs to the "essence of capitalism" as Lukács (1968a, 176) puts it, that it "produces" the phenomena this way: The capitalist mode of production brings with it the economic way of viewing things of which mathematical natural philosophy is a natural consequence: it represents and processes nature in categories that reflect the perception of life under conditions which reduce people to abstract quantities and mechanical ingredients of rationalized processes (Lukács 1968a, 349-350) .
This is why and how medieval science gives way to modern science. Therefore, on Lukács's account the causal influence of social factors extends
In other cases ideas can play a more conspicuous role as Weber's insights suggest.
The case of Protestantism can be interpreted as the story of an idea that emerges in a way that can be put in a causal framework, and the story can be narrated in sociological terms of previous unsuccessful heretic movements, the institutions of the Catholic Church, the crisis of the Catholic Church, and the social consequences of printing technology etc.
And this story can be complemented with another in terms of the behaviour required by the then-contemporary development of productive forces in order to be more productive.
It is not only the development of productive forces, but also the attitude of economic agents toward them that together explain further social developments. In Weber's case the widespread acceptance of the Protestant worldview and man's place in it lead to the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, and thus Protestantism turned out to be a productive force due to its influence on the masses. Arguably, technological development requires ideological support in order to reach the maximum of productive efficacy.
Conclusion
Above I sketched three perspectives from which the history of ideas can be looked at from a sociological perspective and showed that the roots of all three approaches can be traced back to Marx. Two of the three perspectives are interested in causal accounts: the first, perhaps classical, approach focuses on the influence of social and technological circumstances on the production of ideas; the third is focused on the social efficacy of ideas. The second approach sketched above is hermeneutic: it is not interested in causes and effects, but in a contextual understanding of meaning, where context is provided by sociological factors.
It is hard to overlook that, while drawing methodological boundaries between these sociologically oriented approaches to the history of ideas, the boundaries cannot be drawn sharply. The three approaches can be taken more or less simultaneously, or can be changed within a single study: it is easy to move back and forth between the focuses on the social determination of ideas and their social-historical meaning and significance from which their social efficacy follows. It also happens that the three approaches are intertwined to the extent that they cannot be visibly separated.
There is, however, one perspective to which sociological accounts inspired by Marx are not especially sensitive. Maybe due to the influence of Marx's philosophy of history, these sociologies of knowledge are more attracted to the project of connecting important episodes of intellectual history to large-scale processes of historical development and pay much less attention to the actual practices and social dynamics of scholarly communities. This sensitivity has been brought to the attention of science studies thanks to the influence of Wittgenstein, Polányi, and Kuhn who emphasized the process of socialization in scholarly and scientific communities. This process takes place in classrooms and laboratory training while transferring textbook science as well as tacit knowledge whose elements are not and cannot be laid down in textbooks. These microsocial processes transfer practices that are essential in knowledge production -and intellectual production in general.
Much of the later development of science studies is characterized by a growing consciousness that sociology of knowledge can be fruitfully integrated with these smallerscale accounts. For example, this consciousness seems to be characteristic of the recent development of the "strong program's" methodology in the sociology of knowledge.
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This fact indicates that a crucial feature of sociological accounts and a key to their plausibility lies in their methodological complexity. As ideas develop and exert their influence in a complex network of social and intellectual influences, the more complex a sociological interpretation is, the more plausible is the picture it can provide about the sociologically accessible aspect of ideas. Increasing the complexity of interpretation is then a sober heuristic rule to follow that should also be reflected in our methodologies as we strive toward an unified theory of interpretation for a social history of ideas.
